Tag Archives: Consent
Ideas That Matter with Gregory Sadler
About two months ago, Dr. Gregory Sadler—also a public philosopher and also known as the YouTube Philosopher—and I had a discussion about my work. We discussed philosophy of sex, particularly with my research in the three different moral types of … Continue reading →
Three Pictures of Sexual Autonomy and Sexual Consent: Looking at the First View
This is a condensed talk that I gave a few weeks ago at UW-Parkside. I’ll be dividing that talk into three separate posts. Sexual consent has been getting a lot of attention lately. We often hear news about sexual campus … Continue reading →
What if we treated ordinary consent like we treat sexual consent?
Here’s a great comic satirizing our normal, everyday consent as if we treated them like sexual consent. What’s the message? Raise the bar of sexual consent! I got the comic here.
Sexual Consent and Memory
Suppose there is a wife and a husband. They have sex, but the man is being charged with rape. He responds back by saying that she consented. The Attorney General’s office says that she didn’t. Why? It’s because she has … Continue reading →
Is there Such a Thing as “Good” Sexual Objectification? (Part Three)
Let’s recall Marino’s argument: One can consent to objectification in the weak instrumental use. Consent is the morally significant feature that makes objectification permissible. Weak instrumental use is characteristic of the best sexual objectification. Therefore, consent should be the morally … Continue reading →
Is there Such a Thing as “Good” Sexual Objectification? (Part Two)
Let’s recall Marino’s argument: One can consent to objectification in the weak instrumental use. Consent is the morally significant feature that makes objectification permissible. Weak instrumental use is characteristic of the best sexual objectification. Therefore, consent should be the morally … Continue reading →