Dealbreakers and Gamechangers

Quite some time ago, I went to a dance club. At some point, I got off the dance floor and took a break and sat on some couches.  These couches just happened to be near the ladies’ room. There were a group of women near the entrance and I couldn’t help but overhear a young woman explaining the possibility of dating a possible suitor.  Here is how her conversation went. (I’m condensing and filtering lot of details.)

“You guys. I’m seeing this guy, and I don’t know…I mean, he lives in his mom’s basement, he plays video games all day, and he’s not much into animals.  But then, I found out he makes really good poached eggs, he teaches yoga, and put his hair up in a manbun. Oh my god you guys, gamechanger!”

I’m sure I’m reducing a lot of the features of what this woman liked and disliked about the guy. The content isn’t really important.  What I want to focus on is the first set of things she found intolerable (living in his mom’s basement, playing video games all day, and not being in to animals). This set is what I will call “dealbreakers.”

Dealbreakers, at least the way I’m thinking about them, are various character traits where if a potential intimate partner has those traits, one will immediately not want to have any further contact with that person much longer, perhaps at all.

I think when it comes to potential partners, everyone has dealbreakers.  Yes, I know it depends on the context, but I’m sure there are few that you can think of that are more or less absolute.  They can be considered a big deal or superficial. To see what the biggest dealbreakers are, see here.

But what about gamechangers? Do they really exist, especially for long-term partners? I consider a gamechanger as some sort of characteristic, or perhaps some new information that changes that situation into either a positive or negative way. In a way, negative gamechangers are dealbreakers. Positive gamechangers are uplifting experiences where you feel a special closeness with the other person. Both dealbreakers and gamechangers are pivotal transformative moments in how you deal with your potential relationship.

In the context that I gave above, a gamechanger would have to be significant enough to overrule the dealbreaker. But are there such significant gamechangers? Well, according to the person in the story above, then yes. But how do these dealbreakers and gamechangers cash out?

Here’s a possible way to look at dealbreakers: a dealbreaker is enough of a negative feature so as to no longer invest or even start a relationship. It seems that the longer you’re in a relationship, the more tolerant one is with the dealbreakers. After all, maybe a dealbreaker is seeing a potential mate eating with their mouth open. But if you’ve already dated for a number of years, maybe that characteristic isn’t so bad. So dealbreakers can change quantitatively. Moreover, they seem to change qualitatively. The dealbreaker you have now may not be a dealbreaker in the future. Likewise, maybe you’ve gained some dealbreakers that you’ve never had before. So what’s the relationship between dealbreakers and a person? We could probably formulate it like this:

If a person has dealbreaker-1, dealbreaker-2, dealbreaker-3…dealbreaker-n, then we would very likely not want to continue with that relationship. Note: it’s hard to say whether these dealbreakers are conjunctive or disjunctive. It probably depends on the person, and how qualitative the dealbreaker is. If they are conjunctive, then there’s a certain threshold that someone meets in order for someone to leave to potential to continue the relationship.

Now gamechangers are positive features that overcomes the dealbreaker. The gamechanger, in many ways, are surprising elements where you least expect it. We may have a list of what dealbreakers are, but it’s hard to imagine a list of gamechangers because gamechangers are very much in the context. Gamechangers seem to have a quantitative and qualitative feature as well. If quantitative, they seem to work best in a conjunctive manner. Moreover, our gamechangers seem to change over time, meaning we could lose or gain gamechangers.

What’s the relationship between gamechangers and a person? The formula seems to be something like this:

For any dealbreaker (or conjunction thereof), a gamechanger (or a conjunction thereof) overrules the (conjunction of the) dealbreaker(s). Note: the gamechanger has to be more significant than the dealbreaker. Why? I think it’s because a dealbreaker is a such a negative situation that it needs tremendous positive info to overpower that negative info. In other words, the positive of the gamechanger has to be very positive to overpower the dealbreaker. It isn’t enough for the gamechanger to cancel out the dealbreaker. Since the dealbreaker was a transformative experience in the negative, the gamechanger is a positive transformative experience of the transformative experience in the negative.

Here we get to the psychology or even the metaphysics about pains and pleasures. I don’t want to get bogged into details here, but it seems that overcoming a negative is not just finding a positive to counterbalance the feelings, but the positive has to dramatically overrule the negative. Thus, the gamechanger has to be such a huge deal to overpower the dealbreaker. Maybe we have a formula:

potential relationship < dealbreaker(s) << gamechanger(s)

But there’s a time sequence here too. Suppose the gamechanger happened first. You may be so elated with this positive information, but then sometime after that, the dealbreaker happens. No matter how positive the gamechanger was, the dealbreaker after the gamechanger still overpowered the gamechanger.  Thus, for the gamechanger to really be a gamechanger, it has to happen after dealbreaker.

Of course, if you’re already in the relationship, the dealbreaker may lose it’s force over time. After all, you’ve developed a history with that person and that history, it seems, has more prominence than the dealbreakers you have. Of course, there may be absolute dealbreakers where no matter how long you’ve been with that person, the relationship ends if the other person broke one of your absolute dealbreakers.

This isn’t to say that looking at dealbreakers and gamechangers should only be thought about abstractly. Having dealbreakers and gamechangers are psychological, and it’s best to know what your dealbreakers are so that you know what your boundaries are in relationships.  This way, you will have healthy relationships. At the same time, also be aware that your dealbreakers can soften or change over time, and even with the same partner. Likewise, gamechangers are contextual in that they are not just new information that can overpower the dealbreaker, but they are also informed by the length of the relationship, how bad the dealbreaker was, the situation that you’re in, and the overall quality and quantity of the dealbreaker and gamechanger. Gamechangers are hard—if not impossible—to know what they are. But at the same time, gamechangers seem to be a cautious virtue in that it keeps yourself open to the possibility that an investment may still be worth it, and that worth can overpower the dealbreaker. This isn’t to say that if there’s a gamechanger, it should always overpower the dealbreaker. You must know your boundaries, expectations, needs, and desires. But it does suggest that gamechangers are possibly related to virtue ethics, at least related to the virtue of being open-minded or being open to possibilities of your relationship with others.

This is just a very brief sketch of the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of dealbreakers and gamechangers. With this, there is the possibility to have an ethics of dealbreakers and gamechangers, but that opportunity will be left to another time.

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The Ethics of Recognizing Sexiness Part Two

In my last post, I looked at Lintott’s and Irvin’s article about changing the way we perceive people as being sexy. They argue that we ought to see people as sexy subjects, meaning that we can respect people and also “see their body as infused with an expression of self and animated by their own sexual identity.” But now I have some concerns with this project.

My Five Concerns:

1. The first is definitional. It seems that they’re redefining sexiness based on someone being confident and assured of their sexuality. What’s troublesome is that, at least in our society, many men are confident and assured of their sexuality, even in heteronormative ways. Many women are not simply because social norms and oppressions consider that inappropriate. After all, in our society, most women are not confident about their sexuality; they may like sex but because of systemic pressures and cultural expectations, her confidence of her sexuality may not be as high as men’s. Thus, it seems that through the author’s reevaluation, many men are considered sexy, but many women are not. After all, it’s rare to find an Amy Schumer or a Lena Dunham compared to the millions of women who don’t like to express their sexuality. Moreover, it’s much easier to find men who are confident about their sexuality than it is to find women.

2. The authors state that being genuine in their sexiness is what makes them sexy. Being genuine could mean “originality, comfort, confidence, playfulness, and a sense of improvisation, whereas conformity, discomfort, insecurity, and strict adherence to norms will be evidence of a lack of genuineness in sexual expression” (306). Many people may not be confident of their sexuality until they’ve reached an age of figuring out who they are in terms of their sexuality and especially their sexual identity. Take for example many adolescents. Most of them are not sexually confident. Sure, the majority of American have had sex by the age of 17, but they may not be confident of who their sexual identity is. In high school, most of them are concerned with fitting in and not standing out. If being sexually confident is to stand out, then they are very likely going to avoid that. And if being sexy is to be sexually confident, then many high school students wouldn’t be considered sexy based on the author’s criteria. If it’s true that most people don’t have a strong sense of who they are when expressing their sexuality, then most people wouldn’t be considered sexy. It seems odd that we shouldn’t consider someone sexy because they aren’t sure of their sexual identity.

3. There are many people who aren’t sure what sort of sexual identity to have, which may make them lose confidence as to how to express their sexuality. Many trans* folks may still be confused as to how to express themselves, for example. People who are LGBTQIA+ may try to figure that out. If sexuality is fluid as most sexual researchers say, but we live in a society that sees sexuality as more or less stable, then those who are sensitive to being flexible may be misinterpreted as not being confident. Indeed, those people may not be confident because they aren’t sure how to express themselves sexually. We still see this in our culture where bisexuals are not considered a serious orientation because they “haven’t made up their minds” or are “faking” their sexuality. These messages could undermine one’s confidence and thereby not willing to express their sexuality. So then people in the LGBTQIA+ community may not be considered sexy, according to the author’s criteria since many of them may not be sexually confident.

4. Could sexiness be taken away? Suppose you’re in a large city that embraces sexual diversity and they have no problem with your sexual expression. But now suppose you move to another city that is smaller and conservative. They follow heteronormative standards rigidly. Being new to this town could affect how you are treated if you were able to express your sexuality fully. Because of these rigid constructs, you feel uneasy to express yourself. It seems that this new town has affected your confidence and thus your sexuality. This new town, therefore, has taken away your ability to express yourself and thereby your ability to be sexy.

5. Finally, is it possible to go overboard with the sexiness to the point of ridiculousness? This may not be a good example, but imagine various people on the Jerry Springer or Maury Povich show who flaunt their sexuality, but over dramatically so. The flaunting isn’t done in a sexy way, but it almost parodies the flaunting nature. Of course, this could be because the producers and editors make the clips in such a way where the presentation is overly dramatic, and to be honest, I’ve never encountered this overly dramatic flaunting nature in real life, but we can still imagine it and even witness it on a tv show.

There are many people like this where they flaunt their sexuality and they don’t care what others think of them. They are definitely confident and they are “see[ing] their body as infused with an expression of self and animated by their own sexual identity.” But are they sexy? The authors would have to say yes, but I’m not so sure. Yes, seeing someone expressing their sexual identity is sexy, but the way they flaunt this isn’t sexy, at least not to me. I wouldn’t even say it’s flaunting. Rather, it’s just being narcissistic. Now, I’m sure the producers overplay this just to get ratings, but suppose these are real representations. Granted, maybe something is wrong with me and I have to go through an internal ethical project where I have to change my perspective to see them as sexy. Nevertheless, should we consider them sexy? I can’t empathize with them. Again, is that my problem? The authors state that we should consider someone as desirable, not necessarily someone you experience desire for. Thus, a lesbian could consider a man sexy, according to the authors. Maybe that’s my problem: I can’t even consider the people above as desirable. But perhaps if I shifted and expanded my concept of sexiness or desirability, maybe I could?

Undergoing the Ethical Project

Next, the authors state that we ought to cultivate the habit of recognizing sexiness. But how do we do this? This is a psychological question more than anything. How do we learn to experience this person now as sexy when we didn’t originally before? Is the sher will doing the work here?

First Example: Queer Pornography

The authors suggest Sins Invalid—a site dedicated to people with disabilities who perform—as a way to expand our view of sexiness to disabled performers where we can expand our sexiness without objectification. Another project would be the queer pornographic site Pink and White Productions or the Crash Pad Series. It’s controversial whether there can be ethical porn. I’ll leave that an open question. However, with these sites displaying queer pornography, it breaks down the stereotypical pornographic standards of both men and women. Rather, the site shows many different sexual encounters and breaks the rules of beauty and sexual norms, yet portrays it in a sexy way. Examples include trans* folks being sexual, people who identity as queer, disabled porn performers, and bodies of all types. Indeed, assuming it is ethical, the authors may contend that we have an ethical obligation to desire feminist and queerporn, that is assuming that such porn can be ethical, but also to expand our concept of what is sexy so as to undermine the conventional standards of what is sexy. After all, mainstream porn hyperfocuses on social standards of beauty.

Second Example: Artificial Intelligence

If sexiness isn’t about external bodily beauty standards, but more about how such beings carry themselves in a sexualized way, could this be true for nonhumans? Take, for example, Samantha from the movie Her. Could Samantha be considered sexy in the way the authors have suggested? Samantha is an artificial intelligence operating program and who eventually gets involved in a relationship with a user. I hope I’m not giving any spoiler alerts, but she seems to carry herself in a sexual way, perhaps to the point of what the authors consider sexy. What makes this interesting is that Samantha doesn’t have a body. Well, not really. I mean, she’s in the computer and she’s in the user’s phone. But since she can leap from the computer to the phone, then she’s in the cloud in order to do the leaping. But the cloud isn’t really a place (forget about how it’s all storage in some unit in Silicone Valley). If the leaping can be done wirelessly, then Samantha’s body is diffused throughout space and as long as you have a strong Wi-Fi (presumably), then you can access her. So Her actually makes a stronger case for the author’s claim: it’s not the outward appearances, but the way you carry yourself in a sexual way. However, the author’s do say that “[t]o find a person sexy…is to see their body as infused with an expression of self and animated by their own sexual identity” (305, my emphasis). And yet, Samantha has no body, but we could still say that she carries herself, her persona, and is animated by her own sexual identity. I do think she has a sexual identity, but she has no body that performs that, unless you count the various bodies she has (e.g. computer, cell phone, human surrogate). But again, her body becomes exceptionally fluid and she can leap from body to body. Is she still sexy? According to the author’s criteria, I’m not sure.

Conclusion

And so we reach the end of this post. I’ve looked at Lintott’s and Irvin’s article about changing the way we perceive people as being sexy and I’ve given five concerns about this project. Moreover, there are a couple implications we can gather from this project too. Overall, I think this has a fine contribution in bodily aesthetics and the importance of what it means to be sexy. Their new criteria could use some improvement, but it certainly has improved the old standard model of sexiness = mere sex object.

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The Ethics of Recognizing Sexiness Part One

Not my image

Suppose someone said to you, “you are sexy.” How would you respond? It obviously depends on the context, but let me offer two possibilities.  On the one hand, you might experience something negative simply because you are seen as an object. The negative emotion could be anger, revulsion, shame, embarrassment, or disgust. Notice that you could say, “thanks” but still feel a negative emotion because the thought that someone would think of you as sexy is revealing: the other person considers you within some sexual realm (whatever that may mean). It isn’t that you are simply attractive or beautiful; you are someone that is sexually arousing, causing sexual desire. And, depending on the context, can make you very uncomfortable, embarrassed, or feel awkward.

On the other hand, another response is that you may experience something positive. You may be excited, thankful, happy, filled with self-confidence or self-esteem, empowered, and you may consider yourself more attractive. You may see yourself as an object, but not essentially. You may still see this sexy object and feel something positive that you are this object, and that you recognize yourself as this object.

Notice with both accounts, you are still an object. It just happens that you consider yourself in relation to this object as something positive or negative.

But what if someone goes deeper and says that they don’t see you as a sexy object, but as a sexy subject? How would you respond? I think most would consider that confusing, but maybe thankful (in that you are not considered as a mere object) or maybe deflated (in that you are not considered as an object at all). Sheila Lintott and Sherri Irvin are investigating what it means to be sexy and argue for a positive reclamation of sexiness from a feminist lens. The article tackles many meanings of what it means to be a sex object. I’ll be referencing the article in the book, Body Aesthetics.

Sexy Subjects

Here is what the authors contend: In one way, being sexy is objectifying, but on the other hand, denying sexiness is also denying her subjectivity. What I’m interested in is what the authors set out to do in part III: a normative conception of sexiness that also accommodates respect for persons. What this means is to respect people, in that we see people as legitimate autonomous beings. But seeing someone as sexy is also recognizing that, as sexy subjects, people are free to desire and pursue the sorts of pleasures they find worthwhile. In other words, there’s nothing wrong with seeing someone as sexy as long as you are respecting that person’s subjectivity and not trivializing (reducing?) that person into an object. Let me bring some context and background from the authors in order to move the argument forward.

First, sexiness is not an attribute anyone has, but a way of being. It is how one engages with the world with certain mental states and attitudes, and not something anyone has.

Second, sexiness is not to be tied to bodily attractiveness, but to see their subjectivity for what it is, to appreciate it, and regard it as sexy without necessarily being sexually attracted to that person. In short, the author’s revisionist project is to change our conception of sexiness in such a way where we can say that someone is sexy without being sexually attracted to that person.

Third, expressing one’s sexuality gives a positive, and perhaps even an empowered sense of that person’s identity. To deny that is to deny an aspect of that person’s identity.

With that background, the authors thesis is striking: there is an ethical obligation to recognize people as sexy subjects. “The respectful notion of sexiness merges a concern for the subjective and embodied life of a person with an assessment of their body as a sexualized one. To find a person in this sense is to see their body as infused with an expression of self and animated by their own sexual identity.” (305). So we can see someone sexually appealing, but not sexually arousing. We ought to reevaluate how we appreciate people’s sexiness without it being connected to being sexually attracted to them. To respectfully see people as sexy is to consider their subjective life and how they are in charge of their sexual agency. They are intrinsically appealing based on their own terms instead of finding them sexy based on external standards. But what’s the ethical push here? Why do we ought to regard people as sexy?

The way I understand it is that by viewing people as sexy subjects, we not only undermine cultural norms of what ought to be sexy, which is usually objectifying, but it gives people a sense of empowerment and it recognizes people’s subjectivity. It’s not just subjectivity in a Kantian universal-rational sense, but it’s to see their particular individuality. You see the person qua person, not person qua rational being, which is to say that people are sexy not because they follow certain social standards of what is sexy (e.g. beauty standards, dressing a certain way, external fashions), but more about how people carry themselves in that the way they express themselves are sexy.  It’s the way people infuse their sexuality to their body. They don’t provide any examples, so I’ll try to provide one and I hope it’s a good representation of what the authors are suggesting.

Many people in the media have had a complicated relationship with Amy Schumer and Lena Dunham’s expression of their sexuality.Both of them talk about sex and sexuality in honest ways and they are not ashamed of it. On the contrary, they seem to speak about it with such confidence and a genuine expression of what they want. On the other hand, both of them don’t follow conventional social norms of what is sexy: they are both slightly overweight, they talk about sex in detailed ways which isn’t socially acceptable for many women, they don’t follow the social standards of what is sexy, and they discuss controversial issues regarding feminine or sexuality. Yet, they are in charge of their sexuality whereby they are sexually appealing, and not necessarily sexually arousing. This isn’t to say that they could be sexually arousing, but that’s not the essential thing. More than that, maybe they can be sexually arousing because they are sexually appealing. Overall, it’s to recognize sexiness on their own terms and not societal expectations. To see their genuineness in sexuality also involves empathy. Therefore, Schumer and Dunham could be considered sexy according to the authors of this article.

(As an interesting question, would the authors suggest that part of their ethical project is to reevaluate sexiness such that seeing someone sexually arousing is an effect of seeing their sexual subjectivity?)

So far, I have only given the argument from Lintott and Irvin. But are there some concerns? What are the implications of their theory? While I find their project fascinating and positive, I have some concerns. I’ll reserve those thoughts in the next post.

 

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Explaining CRISPR

First, let’s get an understanding of what CRISPR is. In an extremely oversimplification, CRISPR is an editing tool where a genetic engineer can cut and edit out parts of DNA—usually unhealthy bits—and replace them with benign parts. It has the promise of curing hereditary diseases, cancer, and other genetic defects. For a better visualization, see this:

Now, check out how a biologist explains CRISPR to people of five different levels of knowledge: a seven-year old, a high-schooler, a college student, a grad student, and a post-doc expert on CRISPR:

What I find really interesting is that with the seven-year old, the biologist basically has to start with the basics of biology and already the kid’s mind is blown. But as we advance to higher levels of knowledge, the conversation slowly leaves biology and into philosophy, specifically the ethics behind CRISPR. With the high school student and the college student, the biology is briefly explained, and then they get into the ethics. With the grad student, they hardly discussed any biology and just went straight into the ethics. With the post-doc, they discussed a little biology and ethics, but I think they were discussing the philosophy of biology and science. I have to admit, I was a little lost with the post-doc, but the point is is that it’s remarkable that with this idea, they immediately went to the philosophical implications.

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Sexual Desires, Mind-Body Dualism, and Somatic Practices

This is a somewhat lengthy post. You can read to tl;dr summary if you scroll toward the bottom.

In Ann J. Cahill’s article, “Sexual Desire, Inequality, and Transformation,” she argues for an ethical transformation so that your sexual desires do not reflect the sexist or racist inequalities of our culture. For example, there may be someone who is attracted to Asian women because they are stereotypically associated with submissiveness, passivity, and fragility. While her insights are intriguing and thought-provoking, I was more interested on what she had to say next: one solution to change these racist and sexist desires is to change the actions, such as avoiding Asian women in social contexts. Change the behavior, one may transform the desires.The ethics behind this solution is to move the bodily behavior toward the mental, where we transform behavior, but not desires. Cahill is skeptical of this solution. The problem is that “it seems to provoke, perhaps necessarily, a structure that associates sexual desires with the body and a commitment to racial justice with the mind, thus perpetuating mind-body dualism” (289). The problems is that it not only buys into mind-body dualism, but it sets up a mind-body hierarchy as well.

So what’s the problem with mind-body dualism, at least the way she mentions it in the article? For one, it’s contrary to our human experience. Second, it “is deeply implicated in inequalities of all sorts, particularly those associated with sex/gender, sexual orientation, and disability” (290). Unfortunately, she doesn’t go further to explain why, but mentions that she and others working within the feminist project have made these points before. You can get a glimpse of those various arguments here.  Basically, in the history of philosophy, the separation of mind and body has been correlated with male and female respectively in that the male has been associated with the mind and that attaining rationality is a key feature of philosophy; the female has been associated with bodily features and material aspects, so attaining rationality is more challenging. These dual aspects privilege one side over the other and the male side just happens to be on top of the hierarchy. Cahill, instead, argues that a phenomenological perspective seems more accurate in that we are embodied beings.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that the feminist criticism is correct. For Cahill, our sexual desires are embodied, or at least should be embodied. If there’s a separation between our mind and bodies when it comes to sex, we feel “not at one.”

Is there empirical research to show whether our sexual desires are embodied, or whether they are “separate from us” where we feel “not at one?” Luckily there is.  We can turn to the science of sexual arousal and desire through the work of Meredith Chivers, whom you can read about here. Chivers got mainstream attention in 2009 when she revealed that men’s and women’s sexual concordance are drastically different. Sexual concordance is the mapping of people’s subjective sexual arousal and their physiological responses. So, for example, if a person’s subjective sexual arousal perfectly matches with her physiological response, then we say that we have a 100% concordance. Now Chivers’s work revealed that men’s concordance was about 66%, which is pretty high. If a man has an erection, then, most of the time, he will subjectively say that he is aroused. Women, however, have a concordance of about 26%. They would say that they were subjectively not turned on, but their bodies were.  Or as the author of the article put it, “their minds and vulvas were out of sync.” How could you desire one thing, but your body desired another? Or more specifically to Chivers’s work, how is it that you have an aversion to something, but your body desires it? Gay women’s concordance was a bit higher, but not as high as men’s.

Because women have a stronger non-concordance, they may not feel “at one” with their sexual bodies, which can lead to sexual dysfunction.  I think it’s partially due to sexual non-concordance, but also because of the dual control model and response sexual desire (links are NSFW), which are, on average female features of sexuality. We are living in a world where male sexuality is considered the universal form, and if anyone doesn’t follow into that framework, one is dysfunctional, “broken,” or not normal.

Now here, it seems if we go back to Cahill’s analysis, this analysis looks similar to mind-body dualism. Many women’s experiences suggest that they don’t feel at one with their bodily sexual arousal. Could we still be embodied beings even with Chivers’s analysis? I think this is where Cahill’s ethical analysis comes in, not about changing sexual desires, but more about “building” an embodied sexual being. It seems that the more in tune people are with their sexuality, the more sexually embodied they are.

In short, the argument I’m extracting from this is if the worry that mind-body dualism entails gender hierarchy, and not being in tune with one’s experiences can make people’s minds feel separate from their body, then there is an ethical project to close the gap and try to feel (be?) embodied. If not being sexually in tune with one’s body is to feel disembodied, then there is an ethical project to go through various practices to become sexually embodied.

Now what sort of practices could there be? Here are three that I captured from the article about Chivers:

1. Mindfulness. Lori Brotto has suggested a therapy that could help women be more in tune with their bodies (and hence feel embodied), and that is mindfulness. It’s a bridge to have better sexual awareness. As the article states, it’s makes you more aware of the desires you have, or don’t have: “Approached in this way, sexuality is a window ­into one of the greatest human mysteries: communication between the mind and the body, and how we can better align the two.” She’s currently writing a mass-marketed book to discuss how mindfulness can help people be more present during sex instead of being caught up with internal judgments.

2. Masturbation. From the article: “Research has found that women who masturbate more often have a higher concordance rate: they’re more sensitive to their genital signals. Masturbation holds a clue to men, too. Men on the whole masturbate more frequently than women; far more men than women do it multiple times per week. Men, with their higher concordance, also tend to just check in with their genitals more often, adjusting and prodding them throughout the day.”

“Chivers has also found that the ­higher a woman’s rate of sexual dysfunction is—distressingly low desire, the inability to orgasm, and so on—the lower her concordance.”

3. More Awareness of Gender Dynamics. Both Chivers and Brotto have a hunch that as children, our environment shapes the way we judge our sexual feelings, such that it’s gross or wrong, and this can also influence how we see our sexual bodies.  Over time, this can lead to the dissonance—which is what concerns Cahill. From the article on Chivers and Brotto:

Repeated negative messages could lead girls to dissociate from their bodies, to avoid the normal process of touching and exploring themselves and forging ­genital-neural pathways. This feedback could result not just in girls ­ignoring their sexual impulses, but also in their being ­unable to make sense of them at all.

Why is men’s concordance higher than women’s, on average? Part of it has to do with anatomy, but another part has to do with the cultural messages relating to that anatomy. Women are constantly being bombarded with messages that sexuality, and with their sex specifically is dirty. They are told to keep their hands to themselves and to never touch. Over time, the message is that their sexuality is seen with shame, but also they aren’t in tune with their bodies, which makes their sexuality give the appearance of “mystery.” Moreover, women are told how to look so that they can be attractive and be desired. Doing so means that they focus on their performance of sexiness, but they never get in touch with what they really find sexually desirable or arousing. The answer is to formulate a healthy sexual self-image, where people can understand their sexual bodies, which will make them more in tune with their  arousal and pleasure. These practices can help make their desires externalized and explore what it means to be a sexual being: adventure, curiosity, seeking novelty, sexual experimentation, focusing on sexual practices. If there is still anxiety surrounding their sexual contexts, it could mean a lack of communication, which evidence suggests could therefore decrease their use of contraceptives, but also create the dissonance and make the sexual concordance weaker.

Now I’m sure there are more practices out there, but what I find interesting in these practices is that these are not cognitive therapies to resolve the sexual dysfunctions; rather, these practices are somatic. They are practices of the body rather than changing cognitions of the mind. Body practices has become a new route to curing our ails. We see this especially in physical therapy, but there’s been a call to use our body for political and social ends. You can read more about that here and here. And if you want to see how we can use the body for political and social ends, see here.

tl;dr: I wanted to explore the idea that not being in tune with one’s sexual desires could cause sexual dysfunction, which would make one feel disembodied. According to Cahill, this is troublesome in that it perpetuates mind-body dualism, which has been associated with deep inequalities in the past. Thus, there is an ethical push to close the gap so that one feels embodied. Chivers and Brotto investigate various practices that can close the gap which include mindfulness, masturbation, and more awareness of the gender dynamics.

 

 

 

 

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history of the entire world, i guess

This entertaining video of the history of the world is remarkable. It starts from the big bang all the way up to current times. I’ve learned a lot and the way the narrator presents the facts in fast details really shows how much of history is just a blink:

Bill Wurtz’s bio is here. He also did the history of japan, which was very well-done as well as entertaining.

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Contributing to Stoic Blog

Over at Stoicism Today, I contributed to their blog on Stoic áskēsis. It was challenging, yet fun to write. You can see the post here.

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Deceived into Learning the Truth

In the Discourses, Epictetus says:

If one has to be deceived into learning that external things that lie outside the sphere of choice are nothing to us, I for my part would willingly undergo such deception…

Discourses I.4.27

Now knowing that the external things that lie outside the sphere of choice are nothing to us is considered true in Stoic philosophy.  Thus, we can shorten Epictetus’s statement as saying that if one has to be deceived into learning the truth, then he would willingly be deceived.  This brings up the question: if you were deceived into learning the truth, would you do it?  Is it worth it?

On the one hand, even though you’ve gained the truth through a lie, in the end you still have the truth.  Let’s say that this truth, as analogous to Stoic philosophy, actually makes your life better, that it helps you live a life of well-being.  Perhaps, then, it is worth it.  Call this the consequentialist view of learning about the truth.  This seems to be Epictetus’s position.

On the other hand, the struggle of discovering the truth on your own seems to be character-building as well.  We consider people with good character as finding and discovering things on their own.  Call this the virtuous view of learning the truth.  I’m sure there’s something here that relates to virtue epistemology in that learning about the truth in a certain way matters.

Maybe there’s a deontological view, but I think it would be moot since deontological ethics supposes that it’s wrong to deceive someone in the first place. Thus, they may consider Epictetus’s statement as unethical or epistemically faulty in the first place.

When I was reading this, I asked myself whether being deceived into learning the truth matters. Suppose you have something that you consider true. But suppose you were deceived into learning it? Does it matter? After all, you have the truth, but would you feel upset that you were deceived? Or would you be happy because you have the truth? Personally, I would feel more upset about the deception. I think it’s because being tricked stands out more than simply having the truth.Perhaps in this sense, I fall into the virtuous view.

I guess it also depends on what the truth would be. Perhaps if it was high stakes, I may be happier that I have the truth, but overall, I think I would be more upset because of the deception. But if the truth was very compelling where it would be a huge deal in my life, perhaps I would be happier overall.

Based on just my own thought process, it seems that being deceived is wrong, but up to a point. Consequences can’t be damned no matter what. At some point, you reach a limit where the consequences matter. Now, I don’t have a full-fledged theory as to when they do, or at what limit the virtuous view starts to loose hold and now we’ve got to handle the consequences. I’m sure it’s different for each person, but this brings up two thoughts.

One, does the threshold for each person matter? Since my starting point may be in the virtuous camp, and I seem to remain there up to a certain threshold. I reach a limit, and then the consequences matter become the driving force.  But from this perspective, I seem to suggest that the default position is the virtuous position, and when it comes to some sensitive spot, I now pay attention to the consequences in a profound way. This suggests, perhaps, that having a higher threshold is more virtuous. But does it? Epictetus doesn’t think so. This leads me to my second thought.

Two, does the sensitivity for each person matter? Perhaps my threshold is high, but maybe Epictetus would say that I’m not sensitive to understanding the ramifications of realizing the truth. “Look,” he’d say, “you have the truth and that is profoundly better than having false beliefs. Does it matter how you got there? Sure you were deceived into the truth, but imagine if you weren’t. You’d be worse off because you’d still continue believing in something that is false. Surely having the truth, even deceptively, is much better. Take the truth. You may experience the little pain from the deception, but you should be happier because you have the truth. If you’re still upset from the deception, then doesn’t this just tell us that you’re too sensitive?” I’m not so sure. No one likes being deceived. “Sure,” Epictetus would say, “but you’re being deceived toward something better: the truth. If someone was deceiving you for the sake of deceiving you, then it would be unethical. But the deception isn’t using you as a means; the deception is to make you better off.”

Am I being too insensitive here? Or is Epictetus missing a limiting threshold? Conversely, Epictetus could be too sensitive, or I have too high of a threshold. The way to determine that is see where the mean lies, but that is a difficult task, especially depending on which tradition your virtue theory relies on. Overall, perhaps it makes sense that Epictetus’s point that being deceived is not harmful because for the ancient Stoics, nothing can harm you but your own opinions and thoughts. And if being deceived worries you, then that’s your problem. Maybe, in the end, he has a high threshold, not in the epistemic sense, but in the social-relations sense. Or perhaps he’s too insensitive to our social-relations.

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How Complacent Are you?

There’s a book coming out by Tyler Cowen called The Complacent Class. Cowen argues that Americans have gotten so comfortable to the point where they are complacent.  We’ve sheltered ourselves to the point where we avoid change. In a way, we’re taking on our own privileges but don’t reach out because it’s too uncomfortable.

It may be over-simplistic, but Cowen has developed a quiz to see how complacent you are or too comfortable with your life. It has 27 questions and most of them are thought-provoking in that it takes into perspective as to whether you’re too comfortable.  However, some questions didn’t take things into context.  For example, I’m in grad school and so it’s really hard for me to be mobile and reach out to a community. At the same time, one of the questions is asking whether you’ve lived in a neighborhood where you were the racial minority? For me, I’m always the racial minority so that gives me an automatic pass. Nevertheless, I took the quiz and I got “comfortable.” It makes sense given where I’m at in life, and it gives you a push to see how you should avoid complacency and push for change.

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Is 2017 Going to be Better?

With 2016 dying off and 2017 already starting, I’ve already been bombarded with a couple big deaths that happened in the New Year. Moreover, I’m also getting news about upcoming political challenges for the upcoming Trump Administration. But wasn’t this turmoil and sadness supposed to end in 2016? Wasn’t 2016 the shitty year and 2017 the year of new beginnings? Toward the end of 2016, I saw and heard a lot of social media and memes looking forward to the end of 2016 along with the idea that 2017 would bring forth a fresh start. I, however, remain pessimistic.  Why? Let’s consider the reasons why many people considered 2016 to be really shitty. I can’t delve into the personal lives of people, but I’d imagine that it had to do with the huge amount of deaths of major celebrities and the political fallout of Brexit and Trump winning the American election. There were many indirect hits too such as racial tensions being very high, sexist remarks being rampant, and immigration thoughts on automatically closing the borders. The last three reflects the political climate which is related to Brexit and Trump. I won’t say what caused what, but there is likely a feedback loop of these events causing each other.

For now, I will mention the huge amount of the celebrities’ deaths and the political climate.  Starting with the political climate, many progressives will consider these events as a backward step. Specifically with Trump, many conservatives find him troublesome. I consider Trump a major problem because he’s such a wild card and unpredictable. Yes, I understand that many people had problems with Clinton. But with Clinton, you knew what you were getting into: the status quo. I’m not a fan of the status quo, but I’ll take it over wild unpredictability, especially when it’s from someone with the temperament who can’t handle criticism. With the various people on his cabinet, his friendly relations with Putin, his total ignorance of worldly affairs, and his rhetoric about women, Muslims, disabled people, homosexuals, and the Black community, we have someone who is a different kind of politician.  2016 was also strange with the political campaigns and hardly anyone predicted that Trump would make it this far, let alone winning the election. At least with 2016, you had someone in charge and we know what we have, even if you disagree with it.  With 2017 starting, it’s just the beginning of a total unpredictable chaos, and with chaos, you get fear, and with fear, you will get more racial tensions, traditional hegemony, and populist anger. All of this will affect everyone’s personal lives, either directly or indirectly.

With the celebrities’ deaths, I think what made this surprising is that there were so many of them. However, let’s consider why so. Most of the celebrities were in their old age. But think about when they were born. Most of these celebrities are baby boomers. With the baby boomers dying off, it should be no surprise that we would see so many of them dying just because there are a lot of baby boomers. And yet, there are a lot more baby boomers out there.  If the baby boomers are now coming of age where they are dying, then we’ve only just begun seeing the mass amount of deaths. 2016 may have been just the beginning of celebrities’ deaths.So much so that around Thanksgiving, I predicted that three more major celebrities would die before 2016 ended. I was right with the deaths of George Michael, Carrie Fisher, and Debbie Reynolds. 2017 and more years to follow will see a lot more.  I’m not sure when we’ll see a peak in the amount of celebrities’ deaths, but I’m thinking 2016 was not it.

For these reasons, 2016 may have been shitty, but I think 2017 is going to be worse.

I hope I’m wrong.

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